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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the impact of internal infrastructure and landlockedness on 
Central Asian trade. The impact of landlockedness on Central Asian’s trade costs 
is split into several components, using a panel gravity equation estimated on a 
large sample of countries (167 countries over 1992-2004). Our findings highlight 
that an improvement in the own infrastructure of Central Asian countries from 
the level of the median Central Asian country to that of other landlocked 
countries would raise exports (imports) by a modest 2.4% (3.1%). By contrast, an 
improvement in Central Asian transit-country infrastructure to the level of the 
other landlocked countries would raise the representative CAC’s exports by a 
whopping 49%. Other dimensions of landlockedness considered in this study are 
also great impediments to trade. Either diminishing the extra overland costs or 
enhancing the ability to negotiate sea access would significantly increase Central 
Asian trade, ‘’transit monopolies’’ (single transit corridors) reducing trade 
significantly. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Central Asia, Landlockedness, Trade, Transport Infrastructure, Panel 
data. 
 
JEL Codes: C23, F13, F15, P33. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Soviet Union’s collapse in the 1990s was expected to lead to a major 
reorientation of the former bloc’s trade, given that politically-determined trade 
links under central planning had given rise to substantial over-trading between 
former Soviet Union states. For instance, Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003) estimated 
that former Soviet Union countries traded 43 times more between them than 
predicted by GDP and distance. Conversely, Hamilton and Winters (1992) and 
Baldwin (1994) calculated that potential trade between former Soviet Union 
countries and the EU was more than four times the actual volume. However, by 
the late 1990s, if trade with the Soviet Union had indeed shrunk, reorientation 
was limited as trade with other regions had failed to take off. By 1998, for 
instance, trade between Russia and former Soviet Union countries, although 
reduced, was still 30 times greater than ‘normal’ (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 2003).  
 
Designing policies to assist the Central Asian Countries (CACs)1 to achieve the 
reorientation of their foreign trade and integrate in the global economy requires 
an understanding of the nature of their handicaps that goes beyond the 
mechanical effect of landlockedness. What is needed is an understanding of (i) 
how the effect of landlockedness interacts with that of poor infrastructure in the 
CACs and in neighboring (transit) countries; and (ii) what practical policy steps 
can help mitigating the effect of landlockedness on trade. 
 
The literature so far explains hysteresis in former Soviet Union trade by 
remoteness and landlockedness2 (Kaminski, Wang and Winters, 1996; Djankov 
and Freund, 2002; Grafe, Raiser and Sakatsume, 2005), poor access to markets 
and incomplete reforms (Havrylishin and Al-Atrash, 1998), weak institutions 
(Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Maurel, 2004), poor product quality (e.g. Bevan et 
al., 2001), and hysteresis in consumption, production and business networks 
(Djankov and Freund, 2002).  
 
Beyond Central Asia, a voluminous gravity-based literature has also provided 
estimates, often incidental, of the impact of landlockedness on trade. Typically, 
these studies included a dummy variable equal to one for landlocked countries. 
For instance, Carrère (2006) found that, on the basis of a panel gravity model, 
ceteris paribus a landlocked country traded about 28% less than a coastal one. 
Estimates of similar magnitudes were found in other studies. Clearly, these 
estimates could explain only a small part of the CACs’ under-trading with the rest 
of the world. Indeed, few of those papers focused explicitly on the impact of 
landlockedness on trade. One notable exception was Raballand (2003) who 
analyzed the effect of landlockedness on trade in the case of Central Asian 
countries. Using a restricted sample of 46 CIS countries, 18 of which landlocked, 
over a period of 5 years (1995-1999), he found landlockedness to reduce trade by 
more than 80%. This very large impact, substantially out of step with usual 
estimates, was at least partly due to the fact that his landlockedness variable was 
equal to one only for bilateral trade between two landlocked countries, while the 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, by Central Asian Republics, we mean Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
2 Only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have access to the Caspian Sea, itself a landlocked sea 
bordered only by Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran, while Uzbekistan is twice landlocked, i.e. surrounded 
by countries that are themselves landlocked. 
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landlockedness variable in other studies usually marks the bilateral trade of 
landlocked countries with all their partners, landlocked or not.  
 
Dummy variables in a gravity equation are black boxes that do not tell us much 
about how landlockedness affects trade. A limited number of studies have shed 
light on the channels through which its impact is felt. In his study of Central 
Asian trade, Raballand (2003) introduced two components of landlockedness ---
shortest distance to a major port facility and number of borders crossed in 
transit, and found them to have significant effects. Using CIF/FOB data from the 
IMF for 97 developing countries, 17 of which landlocked, Radelet and Sachs 
(1999) estimated that transport and insurance costs were twice as high for 
landlocked countries as for coastal countries. They concluded that “geographic 
isolation and higher shipping costs may make it much more difficult if not 
impossible for relatively isolated developing countries to succeed in promoting 
manufactured exports”. Limao and Venables (2001) found a large effect of 
infrastructure development on trade costs, in particular for landlocked countries, 
on the basis of a cross section of countries with controls for the level of transit-
country infrastructure. The high impact of remoteness and infrastructure on 
trade costs was also evidenced by Brun et al. (2005). Using IMF estimations of 
freight payments as a percentage of imports, Stone (2001) found a comparable 
transport cost burden. The transport costs were lower in transit states than in 
landlocked countries in 75% of the cases, from the 64 possible comparisons 
between landlocked countries and transit countries. 
 
In this paper, we revisit the evidence using a large panel  of bilateral trade flows 
between 167 countries over 13 years spanning 1992-2004. Particular attention is 
given to the econometric specification of the gravity model in order to eliminate 
sources of biases common in conventional gravity models. In particular, we take 
advantage of the sample’s panel structure to include country-pair specific effects 
instead of the usual exporter and importer effects (making the identification of 
time-invariant country characteristics like landlockedness possible) and treat 
carefully the potential endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. Using 
this proper specification, we assess the impact of domestic infrastructure and 
landlockedness on Central Asian trade and provide a decomposition of 
landlockness’ impact on transport costs into several components, such as 
overland distance to port or transit-country infrastructure.  
 
Our empirical results show that an improvement in the own infrastructure of 
Central Asian countries from the level of the median Central Asian country to that 
of other landlocked countries would raise exports (imports) by a modest 2.4% 
(3.1%).3 In the same way, an improvement in Central Asian infrastructure 
network to the level of the median coastal country would raise exports (imports) 
by 14.5% (19.6%). Thus, the impact of domestic infrastructure appears limited.4 
By contrast, an improvement in Central Asian transit-country infrastructure to 
the level of the other landlocked countries would raise the representative CAC’s 
exports by a whopping 49%. Other dimensions of landlockedness considered in 
this study are also great impediments to the trade of Central Asian countries. 
                                                 
3 Maintaining all other variables at the level of the representative Central Asian country (median 
value). 
4 And not specific to landlocked countries as the associated coefficient is the same for all countries 
in the sample. 
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Hence, diminishing the extra overland costs (proxied by the distance to the 
nearest port) or enhancing the ability of a landlocked country to negotiate sea 
access compared to others landlocked countries would significantly increase 
Central Asian trade, ‘’transit monopolies’’ (single transit corridors) reducing trade 
significantly. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts on 
infrastructure and geographical disadvantages of Central Asia. Section 3 develops 
the assessment method of the impact of infrastructure and landlockedness on the 
Central Asian trade. Section 4 details the results. Section 5 provides some 
concluding remarks and suggests some induced policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. STYLIZED FACTS ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
DISADVANTAGES OF CENTRAL ASIA 
 
High transport costs are certainly one of the main impediments to the 
reorientation of Central Asian trade. The distance of Central Asian countries from 
the main economic markets is of course only part of the story5. The density and 
quality of internal infrastructure are also determining factors of Central Asian 
trade costs, though perhaps more important in terms of trade policy. Limao and 
Venables (2001) emphasized that distance explains only 10% of changes in 
transport costs. Poor road infrastructure represents 40% of the transport costs 
predicted for coastal countries and 60% for landlocked countries. We shall show 
that this is particularly relevant for Central Asian countries.  
 
However, distance and internal infrastructure alone do not explain why Central 
Asian countries are at a disadvantage even compared to countries with similar 
infrastructure endowments or which are similarly remote but which have sea 
access. Once low incomes, a poor internal infrastructure network, distance and 
remoteness are controlled for statistically, landlockedness still has a negative and 
highly significant impact on trade (see Limao and Venables 2001, Raballand 
2003 or Carrère 2006). There are many reasons for this. For instance, overland 
distances are more penalizing than sea distances because of their higher costs per 
mile. Moreover, landlocked countries are dependent on sovereign transit 
countries for their trade, a dependency that may only serve to compound existing 
problems.  
 
We present direct estimates of transport costs for Central Asia in Section 2.1.  The 
internal infrastructure of Central Asian countries is analyzed in Section 2.2., 
while the specific costs of landlockedness are discussed in Section 2.3. 
 
2.1   Direct estimates of Central Asian transport costs 
 
Direct estimates of transport costs have been gathered from a survey of transport 
firm managers along various routes linking Europe and Central Asia (see 
Raballand et al., 2005). They show that the cost of transporting a 40’ container by 
                                                 
5 See World Bank (2004) for an illustration of the main route corridors and distances for 
international freight movements to and from the main trade centers of the region. The five Central 
Asian countries are clearly remote from the main global markets. 
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road rises by and large linearly with the distance; a slightly higher derivative was 
recorded for the Central European leg of the journey (between Warsaw and 
Moscow). However, the cost of transporting a 20’ container by rail rises less than 
proportionately with the distance after the Moscow leg. Although Raballand et al. 
do not offer any reasons why this is the case, it is likely that these cost differences 
reflect the politically motivated subsidization of freight rates in the former CIS.6  
 
The same picture emerges for transport times. Unlike costs, time rises more than 
proportionately with distance after the Moscow leg, which reflects more difficult 
conditions for both rail and road cargo. Similar observations have been made for 
the trade route between the US and Central Asia.7 Aside from a change in 
transport costs and time per kilometer, it is worth noting that long distances 
produce extremely high transport costs (USD 6,000 for a 40’ container from 
Paris to Tashkent, a prohibitive level for most types of cargo).  
 
2.2 Internal infrastructure: a common component of transport costs 
across all countries 
 
The relation between infrastructure and trade are supported by both theoretical 
(e.g. Bougheas, Demetriades and Morgenroth, 1999) and empirical evidence (see 
Limao and Venables, 2001). Limao and Venables (2001), using a combination of 
shipping data and CIF/FOB ratios, have shown that a deterioration in the 
infrastructure from the median to the 25th percentile raised transport costs by 12 
percentage points and reduced trade volumes by 28 percent. The issue of 
inadequate infrastructure is of particular relevance for Central Asia. 
 
Estache and Goicoechea (2005) have shown that Central Asia has low levels of 
transport and communications’ infrastructure. For instance, railway density is on 
average 5.4 rail-km per 1,000 sq. km, i.e. one-third of the average railway density 
of low- and middle-income countries. This is a particular cause for concern given 
that approximately 90% of total freight transport in Central Asian countries 
during 2000 was by rail (see Raballand et al. 2005). It is therefore fair to say that 
low infrastructure levels are likely to affect Central Asian trade, and that the lack 
of investment in existing infrastructure increases transport costs. 
 
Given the availability on the data regarding roads and rails, we use the indicator 
from Limao and Venables (2001). It is commonly used since in the literature to 
assess the infrastructure level in international trade studies, even if it focuses on 
quantitative aspects of infrastructre rather than on qualitative ones.8 
                                                 
6 It should be noted, however, that freight rates on routes between Moscow and Central Asian 
capitals are differentiated in terms of cargo, with low rates applying to primary product shipments 
(e.g. cotton from Uzbekistan) from Central Asia to Russia. We are grateful to Eskender Trushin 
from the Tashkent Bureau of the World Bank for pointing this out.  
7 For instance, Stone (2001) notes that freight rates per mile are twice as high for a container 
shipped to Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) than for one shipped to Ankara. 
8 With this indicator, we ignore other important aspects of infrastructure such as maintenance and 
services. See for instance the Asian Bank of Development Bank (2006) that documented a trend of 
deteriorating material and infrastructure, primarily as the result of inadequate maintenance 
(notably for railway infrastructure). According to Pomfret (2005), the insufficient funding 
earmarked for infrastructure maintenance is a phenomenon common to all former Soviet countries, 
where national networks often take precedence over regional networks. Fot the negative impact 
resulting from inadequate road maintenance see Cadot, Dutoit and de Melo 2005; Cadot, Dutoit 
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2.3 Additional costs of landlockedness in Central Asian countries  
 
Landlocked countries often lag behind their maritime neighbors in terms of 
external trade and economic development, even when they have similar distances 
to main trade partners or similar internal transport infrastructure. The reason is 
that landlocked countries also have to cope with long overland distances (notably 
to join ports) and are largely dependent on sovereign transit countries, which 
they have to cross in order to access international shipping markets (see Faye et 
al., 2004, Ojala, 2005, or Carcamo-Diaz, 2004 for surveys on the various forms of 
transit dependency). 
 
Overland distance 
 
Landlockedness affects many countries, but some, such as Switzerland, 
nonetheless manage to prosper. However, the story is altogether different for 
Central Asia. Except for Batumi on the Black Sea (which can be reached only after 
trans-shipment over the Caspian Sea), all ports are more than 3,000 km away 
from their closest Central Asian border. Many are even farther away, the shortest 
route to the sea being the Southern one which happens to go through what is 
probably the most unstable region of the world. Such huge land distances imply 
problems of a different magnitude than those faced by European landlocked 
countries like Switzerland and the Czech Republic, which are 500-600 km away 
from major ports. 
 
In terms of monetary transport costs (one dimension of the problem, although by 
no means the only one), Limao and Venables (2001) estimated that overland 
transport costs rise by as much as $1,380 per 1,000 km compared to only $190 
for overseas transport.  
 
Finally, freight costs lie roughly in the $1,000-3,000 range for distances between 
3,000 and 5,000 km, suggesting average rates of less than $500 per thousand 
kilometers. Although the shortest route is the Afghan one to Karachi via Quetta, 
the Bandar Abbas rail route appears the most attractive. Taking this as a basis for 
our calculations, maintaining the freight rate below 10% of shipment value (a 
high rate given that it covers only overland transport to the port of destination) 
implies a cargo worth at least $15,000, a very high value for a 20’ container −and 
one that would be risky to ship on a hazardous route.  
 
Transit infrastructure  
 
Landlocked countries are completely dependent on their transit neighbors’ 
infrastructure to transport their goods to the nearest port. There are many causes 
of weak infrastructure, including lack of resources, poor governance, conflict and 
natural disasters. Regardless of the cause, weak infrastructure impose direct costs 
on trade passing through transit countries and thus limit the ability of products 
                                                                                                                                     
and Olarreaga (2005) and especially Raballand et al. (2005) in the case of Kazakhstan. On the “soft” 
aspects of the transit sector’s business environment, see “logistics friendliness” survey (based on 
data provided by approximately ten companies involved in international transport and trade in 
Central Asia, Asian Development Bank (2006)). However, the lack of data does not allow us to take 
explicitly into accounts these factors. 
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from landlocked countries to compete in global markets. The relative impact of 
the weak infrastructure of its neighbors has a particularly negative impact on 
those landlocked countries which mainly export primary commodities with low 
value-to-cost ratios rather than high-value products or services. A weak 
infrastructure of a transit country also limits the return to investment in 
landlocked countries’ internal infrastructure due to the restrictions it places on 
market opportunities. The data yielded by CIF/FOB ratios allowed Limão and 
Venables (2001) to estimate that improving the infrastructure of transit 
countries, all other things being equal, would reduce the transport cost 
differential between the median landlocked economy and the median coastal 
country from 46% to 43%, and thus lead to a 2% increase in trade volume. 
 
Transport infrastructure in the Central Asia sub-region has been heavily 
influenced by the needs of the former Soviet Union, with road and rail networks 
designed to facilitate traffic flows towards the European part of Russia, 
particularly Moscow and Ukraine. Road and rail connections are less well 
developed both within Central Asia itself, and between Central Asia and its 
neighbours to the east and south. Connections through China, Iran, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan are limited and poorly developed. There is one major paved road 
corridor through the sub-region, running east to west and linking Tashkent to 
Almaty, with connecting roads to China and Turkmenistan. There is also a single 
rail corridor to China, passing through the high mountains of the Kazakh-China 
border. For more details on the major trade corridor for Central Asian Trade, see 
Ojala (2005). 
 
However, the practicability of transit corridors depends not only on the physical 
infrastructure of transit countries but also on their political climate and on the 
quality of their governance, which, in the case of Central Asia’s transit partners, is 
a particular cause for concern.  
 
Difficult neighbor relations and Limited choice of transit corridors 
 
Landlocked countries are heavily dependent on their political relations with 
transit countries. If there is conflict, whether military or diplomatic, between a 
landlocked country and its transit neighbors, the latter can easily block borders or 
set up regulatory impediments to trade. Even where there is no direct conflict, 
landlocked countries are vulnerable to the political vagaries of their neighbors. 
According to Faye et al. (2004), “although there is a legal basis for rights of 
landlocked transit as outlined in Article 125(1) of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1982), in practice, this right of access 
must be agreed upon with the transit neighbour (Article 125(2) and (3)) and is 
determined by the relationship between the countries.” 
 
As these authors also pointed out, Central Asian Republics have been badly 
affected by cross-border disputes. After the collapse of the USSR, the former 
Soviet republics were divided along previous administrative boundaries, which 
have since been the source of many disputes. As a result, borders are regularly 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.01 
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defended with landmines and physical blockades.9 Ongoing tensions have also 
resulted in a general failure of regional cooperation.  
 
Finally, the limited choice of transit corridors does not allow Central Asian 
countries to negotiate with transit countries. Some new transit agreements are in 
development, but at the present time a number of transit countries continue to 
exercise a monopoly. As noted by UNESCAP 2003, this restricted competition in 
Central Asia in the provision of transit transport services between operators, 
modes of transport and routes may result in inefficient pricing policies and 
services.  
 
3. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND LANDLOCKEDNESS ON 
CENTRAL ASIAN TRADE 
 
In this section we will address two important issues. First, to what extent is 
Central Asian trade affected by the level of internal infrastructure network? 
Second, how far is it reduced by higher transport costs due to landlockedness?  
 
The gravity equation provides a general empirical framework and is especially 
suited to the examination of these issues. This model allows us to identify the 
impact on bilateral trade of variables, such as infrastructure and landlockedness, 
once all other structural determinants of trade, mainly GDP, distance and 
remoteness, are controlled for. The gravity model is presented in detail below.  
 
3.1. Derivation of the gravity equation with infrastructure and 
landlockedness  
 
We use the gravity model as a simple and efficient tool to predict the volume of 
bilateral trade and to assess the burden of landlockedness (see surveys proposed 
by Evenett and Keller, 1998, Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, and Feenstra, 
2004). We adopt the popular version of the gravity model currently applied when 
aggregating trade between economies with an assumed specialization in 
differentiated products. As shown by Deardoff (1998), as well as Anderson and 
Van Wincoop (2003, 2004), the utility maximization of an identical (over 
countries) CES utility function yields the following expression for bilateral 
imports, 
 
 
1
it jt ijt
ijt
wt it jt
Y Y
M
Y R R
σ
θ
−
  
=      
    (1) 
 
where ijtM  is the CIF (cost, insurance and freight) value of the aggregate 
merchandise trade flow imported by country i from exporter j; ( )i j tY is the gross 
                                                 
9 Moreover, according to the World Bank (2005), the most serious problem relates to customs and 
the incidence of unofficial payments, which is extraordinarily pernicious in Central Asia. This 
handicap compounds other customs-related impediments, such as the lack of coordination among 
border-related agencies, complexity of customs’ procedures, lack of transparency in customs’ codes 
and regulations, low utilization of information technology in customs’ operations, as well as long 
transit times. The lack of data does not allow us to take explicitly into accounts these factors. 
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domestic product of country i (j) in t; wtY is the world income in t, θijt is bilateral 
transport costs; σ is the elasticity of substitution in the CES utility function; and 
 , it jtR R  can be interpreted as “multilateral trade resistance” or “remoteness” 
indices. Following Helliwell (1998), Brun et al. (2005), and Carrère (2006), the 
remoteness index is defined as the weighted distance to all trading partners of 
country i:10 
Rit = ∑
j
ijjt Dw  for i ≠ j and with ∑
=
j
jt
jt
jt Y
Y
w for all i.    (2) 
Positive signs are expected: for a given distance Dij, the more remote a pair of 
countries is from the rest of the world, the more they will trade with each other. 
 
The estimation of equation (1) raised issues related to the estimation of bilateral 
transport costs, θijt. In the standard implementation used, among others, by Baier 
and Bergstrand (2002) or by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), transport costs 
include distance (Dij) along with a vector of dummy variables for common 
borders (Bij, equal to 1 if countries i and j share a common border, otherwise 0) 
and landlockedness (Li(j), equal to 1 if country i (j) has no direct sea access, 
otherwise 0). We go beyond the standard specification by including an index for 
the development of infrastructure in period t, Ki(j)t, as suggested by Limao and 
Venables (2001), Brun et al. (2005), and Carrère (2006) The infrastructure 
measure we use is designed to measure the costs of travel in and through a 
country. It is constructed as an average of the density of the road network, the 
paved road network, the rail network, and the number of telephone main lines 
per person.11 Higher values of the index indicate a better infrastructure. Note that 
the cost of oil, which is arguably the main determining factor of the marginal cost 
of transport, is controlled for by the time dummies in the model (see below). 
Thus, the transport cost function, assuming the standard multiplicative form, 
yields: 
 
( ) ( )5 62 3 41 1 1ij i jB L Lijt ij it jtD e K Kα αα α ααθ + += + +         (3) 
 
with the expected signs: 1 2 3 4 5 60, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0α α α α α α> < > > < < .  
 
Note that alternative measures to capture different components of 
landlockedness and to better identify its impact on transport costs and, 
consequently on trade, are developed in Section 3.2. 
 
We replace the bilateral transport costs ijtθ  in equation (1) by its expression in 
equation (3), and we estimate the following equation:  
 
                                                 
10 For a detailed discussion on this approximation see Brun et al. (2005) or Carrère (2006). 
11 Given the construction of the variable, we used 1+Ki(j)t in empirical work. In fact, when Ki(j)t tends 
towards 0, ln (1+ Ki(j)t) tends towards 0. Appendix A3 describes in detail how this index was 
constructed.  
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( ) ( )
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln 1 ln 1
ijt it jt it jt ij
ij i j it jt ijt
M Y Y R R D
B L L K K
β β β β β β
β β β β β ω
= + + + + +
+ + + + + + + +
  (4) 
 
where ijtω is the error term (assumed to have a standard normal distribution), 
and with the following expected signs: β1=1>0, β2=1>0, β3=(σ-1)>0, β4=(σ-1)>0, 
β5=(1-σ)α1<0, β6=(1-σ)α2>0, β7=(1-σ)α3<0, β8=(1-σ)α4<0, β9=(1-σ)α5>0, and 
β10=(1-σ)α6>0 . 
 
We also check the robustness of our results by adding other variables usually 
found in empirical literature (such as populations and the bilateral real exchange 
rate) with a gravity model. 
 
Including other dimensions of transport cost such as roads and rails maintenance 
or border crossing and extortion costs would provide a more complete picture. 
However, given the availability of such data, it would dramatically decrease the 
size of our sample, and would lead to losing the panel dimension. This would 
prevent us not only from controlling for country-pair specific effects, resulting in 
consistency problems in the estimates, but also from taking into account the time 
dimension (1992 to 2004). Then, these costs are assumed as time-invariant in 
what follows, implying the specific effects of our panel structure capture them. 
 
3.2. First set of results: country infrastructure and landlockedness  
 
Panel specification 
 
Our approach relies on a panel estimator which covers two dimensions: country 
pairs and time. We then control for all unobserved bilateral and country-specific 
characteristics that cannot be included here. Omitting the heterogeneity of these 
countries or the effects specific to country-pairs in bilateral trade relations may 
introduce a bias in the estimation of time-invariant variables, such as 
landlockedness dummies, distance to the nearest port, etc. (see Egger and 
Pfaffermayr, 2003, Brun et al., 2005, and Carrère, 2006). Due to the unsuitability 
of a fixed effects model, time effects are modelled as fixed parameters12 and 
bilateral effects as random variables13. Indeed, the within transformation removes 
variables, such as distance, common borders or landlockedness, which are either 
bilateral or country-specific, and time-invariant.  
 
Econometric methods 
 
If no correlation exists between the explanatory variables and the specific 
bilateral effects, the Generalized Least Square estimation (GLS) provides 
consistent estimates of the coefficients. However, variables like GDP or 
infrastructure may be correlated with bilateral-specific effects. The Hausman test 
allows us to control for the presence of any correlation between explanatory 
                                                 
12 We use these time dummies as indicators for the spread of “globalization” and to capture 
common shocks to each country of the world, such as the evolution of oil prices during the given 
period, or the variable YWt of equation (1). 
13 Bilateral effects are specific to each country pair and common to all years. Note that bilateral 
effects differ according to the direction of trade: µij ≠ µji. 
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variables and bilateral-specific effects. 14 The usual way to deal with this issue is to 
consider an estimation of instrumental variables, as proposed by Hausman and 
Taylor (1981). The Hausman and Taylor (HT) estimator is based upon an 
instrumental variable estimator which uses the between and within variation of 
the strictly exogenous variables, as well as the within variation of the variables 
correlated with the bilateral-specific effects. 
 
Data and Results 
 
The model is estimated with data on 167 countries (see Appendix A.1 for a list of 
the countries in the sample) over the 1992-2004 period, with trade data from UN 
COMTRADE (total bilateral imports in current dollars). Data sources for the 
explanatory variables as well as the data transformations are presented in 
Appendix A.3. Once the missing values have been removed,15 185,967 
observations for 23,470 country pairs remain.  
 
Results are reported in Table 1. The results from the error-component model 
(GLS) are reported in the first column. The fit is good (R2=0.66), given that the 
impact of random specific effects are not in the R2 but are part of the residuals. 
However, the Hausman test, based on differences between within and GLS 
estimators, reveals a χ²18 = 875.72, which is highly significant (1%). Hence, this 
test rejects the null hypothesis according to which there is no correlation between 
the bilateral-specific effects and the explanatory variables. Given the bias of the 
GLS estimator, it is necessary to apply the Hausman and Taylor (HT) method.  
 
In the second column, the GDP (Yit and Yjt) and infrastructure (Kit and Kjt) 
variables are considered as endogenous. The results show that these variables are 
correlated with the country pair-specific effects. Indeed, the Hausman test, which 
compares HT with GLS, validates the hypothesis that the instrumentation 
improves the model (the hypothesis on the exogeneity of GDP and infrastructure 
variables is rejected).  
 
Coefficients all have the expected sign and are mostly significant at the 1% level. 
In line with the theoretical hypotheses (see above), import volumes of i from j 
increase with GDP, and the coefficients are close to unity. The elasticity of 
bilateral trade to distance is significantly negative and equals -1.5, while the 
coefficients for remoteness variables are positive (and significant at the 1% level). 
This is because the more remote a pair of countries is from the rest of the world, 
the more they will tend to trade with each other. Countries with a common border 
trade 2.7 times16 more than expected by the gravity equation. All these results are 
similar to the gravity results found in the literature (Limao and Venables, 2001; 
Brun et al., 2005; Carrère 2006; Soloaga and Winters, 2001).  
 
                                                 
14 In order to verify H0: when bilateral effects are not correlated with explanatory variables, 
Hausman (1978) suggests a statistic test based on: [βGLS - βW] . [var(βGLS) - var(βW)]-1 . [βGLS - βW]’. 
Under the null H0, this test statistic is distributed as a Chi-square (χ2) with K degrees of freedom (K 
is the dimension of the vector βW in the within regression, constant excluded). 
15 Countries which do not declare their imports from a partner or which do not import from this 
partner are identified in the same way, i.e. with a missing value. Hence, our data are not censored at 
zero.  
16 2.7=e0.984. 
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Table 1: Results of the gravity equation estimates on panel data 
Mijt   
Variables 1. GLS 2. HT a) 3. HT b) 4. HT a)  
Ln Yit 0.852***   1.066*** 0.973*** 1.078***  
 [141.01] [35.055] [28.655] [29.963]  
Ln Yjt 1.069*** 1.077*** 0.954*** 1.168***  
 
[174.82] [39.071] [28.327] [35.408] 
 
Ln Rit 0.463***    0.579*** 0.409* 0.503**  
 
[7.21] [2.648] [1.753] [2.206] 
 
Ln Rjt 1.263***    0.919*** 0.722*** 1.049***  
 
[19.78]    [4.220] [3.100] [4.705] 
 
ln Dij -1.437*** -1.507*** -1.494*** -1.549***  
 
[73.51]    [31.846] [29.335] [31.946] 
 
Bij 1.267***    0.984*** 0.844*** 0.901***  
 
[12.48] [4.364] [3.443] [3.877] 
 
Li -0.246***     -0.245*** -0.348*** -0,105  
 
[6.98]    [2.658] [3.493] [1.046] 
 
Lj -0.504***    -0.408*** -0.527*** -0.287***  
 
[14.31]    [4.424] [5.194] [2.836] 
 
ln (1+Kit) 0.290***    0.269*** 0.287*** 0.226***  
 
[13.13]    [6.519] [6.850] [4.694] 
 
ln (1+Kjt) 0.507***    0.204*** 0.226*** 0.234***  
 
[22.87]    [5.043] [5.517] [4.991] 
 
ln Nit   0.169**   
   
[2.569] 
  
ln Njt   0.235***   
   
[3.720] 
  
ln RERijt    -0.043***  
    
[6.445] 
 
Number of obs (NT) 185,967 185,967 185,967 154,871  
Number of bilateral (N) 23,470 23,470 23,470 22,159  
R²  0.659     
Hausman test W vs. GLS c) 875.72*** -    
Chi-2(Kw) chi-2 (18)     
Hausman test HT vs. GLS d) - 143.88***    
chi-2(K)  chi-2 (22)    
***, ** and * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (Absolute values of t-student are presented under the 
correspondent coefficients). 
The time dummy variables and the constant are not reported due to space constraints.  
a) Hausman –Taylor method with endogenous variables = lnYit, lnYjt, ln(1+Kit) and (1+lnKjt ) 
b) Hausman –Taylor method with endogenous variables = lnYit, lnYjt, lnNit, , lnNjt,  ln(1+Kit) and (1+lnKjt ) 
c) This test is applied to the differences between the within and GLS estimators. 
d) Hausman test applied to the differences between GLS and HT estimators.  
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The coefficients of both infrastructure variables (importer and exporter) have the 
expected positive sign and are significant at the 1% level, i.e. the volume of trade 
increases with the level of infrastructure. Moreover, they have a sizeable effect on 
trade volumes. Moving from the median to the top 25th percentile in the 
distribution of infrastructure raises import and export volumes by 11.5% and 
8.5% respectively. This is equivalent to being 556 km closer to other countries for 
imports and 426 km for exports.17 The elasticity of trade to internal infrastructure 
is lower than reported in Limao and Venables (2001). This is not surprising since 
we control for bilateral-specific effects and correct for the endogeneity of 
infrastructure variables. Note, however, that our results are consistent with those 
of Brun et al. (2005) and Carrère (2006), who applied the same infrastructure 
indicator, but across a larger sample. They also mirror the findings of Raballand 
(2003) who applied a similar measure on a smaller sample.18 
 
The median value of the infrastructure index, Ki(j)t, is equal to 0.13 for Central 
Asian countries, while it is equal to 0.26 for other landlocked countries, and to 
1.19 for coastal countries in our sample. For Central Asian countries, moving from 
their median infrastructure indicator to that of other landlocked countries would 
promote imports and exports by 3.1% and 2.4% respectively.19 In the same way, 
moving from their median infrastructure indicator to that of coastal countries 
would enhance imports by 19.6% and exports by 14.5%. 
 
Finally, we find that landlocked countries are significantly more disadvantaged 
with regard to trade than coastal countries. According to the predictions of the 
gravity model, and all other things being equal, a country with no direct sea 
access imports 22% less and exports 34% less20 than a coastal country. This 
estimation is in the same range as others studies (e.g.  Carrère, 2006, or Soloaga 
and Winters, 2001). However, this impact is significantly lower than the impact 
calculated by Raballand (2003). However, it is difficult to compare results, as 
Raballand (2003) used a much smaller sample and, most importantly, defined his 
landlockedness dummy as being equal to 1 for bilateral trade between two 
landlocked countries.21 
To check the robustness of these findings, we introduced explanatory variables 
which are often used in empirical literature which apply the gravity model, even if 
                                                 
17 Estimates from column 2 which are evaluated at median distance of 8037, so 
1.115=(2.098/1.403)^(0.269), 1.085=(2.098/1.403)^(0.204),  
556.34=8037-8037* (1.115^( -1/1.507)) and 425.55=8037-8037*(1.085^( -1/1.507)).  
The infrastructure quartiles are computed on the average variable for each country in the sample for 
the 1992-2004 period. See Table 3 below.  
18 We did not find any specific impact of the infrastructure level of individual countries on bilateral 
trade for landlocked countries in general and Central Asian countries in particular. This is not 
surprising as the specificity of landlocked country trade is the dependence on overland distance and 
transit infrastructure, but not especially on the returns of their own infrastructure. Hence, Central 
Asian countries have the same average coefficient for infrastructure as other countries in the 
sample. 
19 1.031=(1.264/1.127)^(0.269) and 1.024=(1.264/1.127)^(0.204).  
20 -0.217=(e-0.245-1) and -0.335=(e-0.408-1). 
21 One could expect to observe the impact of landlockedness on Central Asian countries by simply 
including an interacted variable between the two dummies: landlockedness and Central Asian 
countries. However, since all these countries are landlocked, we cannot distinguish in this 
interacted variable between the impact of being landlocked specific to Central Asia and any other 
constant specific features of this region. However, the definition of alternative variables of 
landlockedness in the next section will enable us to avoid this shortfall. 
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these variables are not formally justified by the gravity derivation used here. In 
the third column, population variables, Ni and Nj, are introduced and are 
significant at the 5% level (e.g. Bergstrand 1989; Soloaga and Winters, 2001; 
Brun et al., 2005). The coefficients of the other variables remain unchanged. In 
the fourth column we introduce the bilateral real exchange rate indices between i 
and j, RERijt (cf. Soloaga and Winters, 2001, Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997, 
Brun et al., 2005, or Carrère, 2006). The RER is defined as the importing country 
i currency value of 1 unit of country j currency. Consequently, any increase in the 
RER reflects a depreciation of the importing country’s currency against that of 
the exporting country, which in turn should reduce imports by country i from 
country j (a negative coefficient is expected). RERijt is included in the fourth 
column of Table 1, and the coefficient, significant at the 1% level, has the expected 
negative sign. Note that the other coefficients remain quite similar after the 
introduction of the bilateral real exchange rate, except for the landlockedness 
variables. However, we have controlled for the fact that the lack of precision in 
the assessment of landlockedness coefficients is due solely to a reduction in 
sample size (and notably in the number of landlocked countries included in the 
smaller sample). 
 
3.3. Additional specifications for landlockedness in the gravity model 
 
As we have seen in Section 2, landlocked developing countries, and especially 
Central Asian countries, have a number of conditions which lead to high 
transport costs and to lower trade levels: they are remote from the major 
consumer markets where their exports are sold, they depend on land transport, 
their infrastructure is inadequate to their needs, and they largely depend on 
transit countries.  
 
In Table 1, once controlled for bilateral distance, remoteness and for the level of 
infrastructure, landlocked countries are still at a disadvantage in terms of trade. 
The landlockedness dummy indicates that imports and exports from a country 
without direct access to the sea are respectively 22% and 34% lower than 
predicted by the gravity model. The major interest in terms of possible policy 
recommendations is to improve our understanding of the impact of 
landlockedness on trade, especially in Central Asia. Then, three alternative 
measures to the landlockedness dummies Li and Lj are developed. As we are 
interested in the costs of landlockedness, all three measures are specified, e.g. the 
greater the variable, the higher the transport costs for the landlocked country and 
the lower its trade. Due to obvious multicolinearity problems, we successively 
include other components of landlockedness. 
 
Distance to the nearest port 
 
The first variable to be considered is the distance (by road, in kilometres) 
between a landlocked import (export) country i (j) and the nearest major port 
facility, Di(j)PORT. This variable captures the additional transport costs from being 
landlocked due to the extra overland distance that must be travelled in order to 
reach the sea. This variable is particularly relevant in the case of Central Asia, as 
already emphasized in Section 2. In the sample, the shortest distance to port is 
around 870 km for a median landlocked country, while it is 3,100 km for a 
median Central Asian country. This is further proof that Central Asian countries 
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are penalized even more than other landlocked countries. Given this substantial 
difference between Central Asia and other landlocked countries, we will allow for 
potential non-linearity in the impact of distance to port on Central Asian trade 
(we include Di(j)PORT both additively and multiplied to a Central Asian dummy).  
 
If we rewrite equation (4) as: 
 
( ) ( )
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
7 8
ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln 1 ln 1
ijt it jt it jt ij
ij i j it jt ijt
i j
M Y Y R R D
B L L K K
X L L
β β β β β β
β β β β β ω
β β
= + + + + +
+ + + + + + + +
= Ω + +
 
 
Hence, the first alternative transport cost function proposed is: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
3 4 5 6211
7 8
1 1 1 1 1 1
ln ln 1 1 ln 1 1
ijBA PORT PORT
ijt ij i ij i j ij j it jt
PORT PORT
ijt i ij i j ij j
D e L B D L B D K K
M X L B D L B D
α α α αααθ
β β

= + − + − + +

 = Ω + + − + + −

(5.A1) 
With the following expected signs:  
3 40, 0α α> > , β7=(1-σ)α3<0 and  β8=(1-σ)α4<0. 
 
The specification implies that a factor of zero is assigned to (i) coastal countries, 
assuming that the main economic centre is located on the coast, which is the case 
for many of the countries sampled; and to (ii) trade between neighbour countries 
(which do not need access to a port). 
 
Results are reported in Table 2. Note that the coefficients of traditional variables 
(Yi(j)t, Ri(j)t, Dij, Ki(j)t, and Bij) remain similar, whatever the specification adopted in 
columns 5-10. Results in column 5 of Table 2 confirm that the distance between 
importing countries and major port facilities is a significant impediment to 
landlocked countries’ trade: coefficients for Di(j)PORT are significant at 1% for the 
exporter, 5% for the importer and have the expected negative signs. As for the 
landlockedness dummies in Table 2, the impact of DPORT is twice as high for 
exports as for imports. For a given landlocked country, all other things being 
equal, doubling the distance to the nearest maritime port (and then the 
proportion of overland distance in the total distance) reduces imports by around 
3% and exports by around 6%. This implies that, all other things being equal, the 
median Central Asian country would respectively import and export 4.3% and 
8.2% more with a median distance to the nearest port by road, which itself is 
equivalent to the distance of other landlocked countries to their nearest ports. Of 
course, this difference is even more important when compared to coastal 
countries’ trade:  all other things being equal, Central Asian countries would 
export (import) around 65% (30%) more had they been median coastal 
countries.22 Finally, the results in column 6 do not reveal any non-linearity in the 
impact of Di(j)PORT on bilateral trade specific to Central Asian countries (the 
coefficients for the variables multiplied with CAi(j) are non-significantly different 
from zero).  
                                                 
22 1.646=(1/3101)-0.033 and 1.304=(1/3101)-0.062. 
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Infrastructure of transit countries 
 
The second defined variable, Ki(j)tTRANSIT, is the average infrastructure index of the 
transit countries used by a given landlocked import (export) country i (j). This is 
reflected in a component of the costs borne by the landlocked countries to reach 
the sea (Appendix A.2 lists the landlocked countries in this sample as well as their 
transit countries).23 As already developed in Section 2, landlocked countries are 
completely dependent on their transit neighbors’ infrastructure to transport their 
goods to a port. The weak infrastructure of transit countries imposes direct costs 
on trade passing through them and thus limits the ability of landlocked countries’ 
products to compete in global markets. The relative impact of such weak 
infrastructure can be all the more severe for Central Asian countries, as they 
mainly export primary commodities (with low value-to-cost ratios rather than 
high-value products or services). Hence, as in the previous case, we allow for a 
potential non-linearity in the impact of a transit country’s infrastructure on 
Central Asian trade (we introduce KitTRANSIT both additively and multiplied to a 
Central Asian dummy). 
 
This variable is expected to assess the cost of crossing transit countries to reach 
the sea, ranging from 0 for coastal economies to a positive value for landlocked 
countries, where the highest values reflect the highest transit transport costs (and 
thus the lowest level of infrastructure in the transit country). We then use a 
transformed measure of this index, so that an increase in the variable is expected 
to be associated with an increase in transport costs.24  
 
Hence, the second alternative transport costs function proposed is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
43
5 6212
7 8
1 11 1 1 1 1 1
1 1ln ln 1 1 ln 1 1
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ijt ij i ij j ij it jtTransit Transit
it jt
ijt i ij j ijTransit Transit
it jt
D e L B L B K K
K K
M X L B L B
K K
αα
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   
 = + − + − + +        

   
= Ω + + − + + −       
(5.A2) 
with the following expected signs:  
3 40, 0α α> > , β7=(1-σ)α3<0 and  β8=(1-σ)α4<0. 
 
As previously mentioned, the specification implies that a factor of zero is assigned 
to coastal countries or to landlocked countries trading with a neighbour to reflect 
                                                 
23 The computation of KitTRANSIT is similar to the one of Limao and Venables (2001). Let L denote a 
given landlocked country and Lt the set of transit countries that L has to cross to reach the sea. 
Ideally, the transit countries’ infrastructure should be weighted by the share of the considered 
landlocked country’s trade that really uses these transit countries to reach the sea. However, 
available data on transit countries only report whether a country is used for transit or not. Hence, 
an equal weight of 1/n is given to each of the n transit countries of a landlocked country L. 
24 There is a caveat. We assume here that no trade (or the same share of trade for all countries) goes 
by air. Although this is clearly unrealistic and the share of trade that is airborne is rising, it is still 
small enough for landlocked countries (and Central Asian countries) to justify such an assumption. 
Moreover, the transport costs from landlocked countries to their neighbouring countries should not 
include transit country costs. For this reason, our variable is adjusted to reflect this fact when 
necessary. 
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correctly that this trade does not bear any extra infrastructure-related transit 
transport costs. 
 
The average level of transit countries’ infrastructure, Ki(j)tTRANSIT , is included in 
column 7 of Table 2. The coefficients have expected negative signs but only the 
coefficients for the exporter are significantly different from zero: high values of 
Ki(j)tTRANSIT, reflecting large transit transport costs (due to weak transit 
infrastructure in the transit countries) significantly hamper exports of landlocked 
countries. Note that internal infrastructure effects continue to be highly 
significant. 
 
Central Asian trade, both in terms of exports and imports (see column 8), is 
particularly sensitive to the level of infrastructure in the transit countries:  the 
coefficients associated with CAi (j) are significant at the 1% level and highly 
negative. The transit countries for Central Asian trade have a median 
infrastructure index equal to 0.11, while the median level of the transit countries 
infrastructure index for non Central Asian landlocked countries is 0.60. Results 
in column 8 imply that if central Asian countries had access to transit countries’ 
infrastructure which is similar to that of the others landlocked countries, their 
imports would increase by 14.6% and their exports by 44.8%.25 
 
Number of borders shared with coastal countries 
 
A third measure analyses the ability of a landlocked country to negotiate sea 
access at the lowest cost. Bi(j)TRANSIT relies on the number of borders it shares with 
coastal countries and is expected to capture the transit costs: the greater the 
number of coastal neighbours, the lower the transit costs. It is critical for a coastal 
country to attract transit trade flows from landlocked states. If a monopoly exists, 
the landlocked country has no bargaining power, which in turn has a negative 
impact on trade. A decrease of 1 in the indicator corresponds to an additional 
coastal neighbour that could strengthen the competition between the potential 
transit countries and weaken the bargaining power of each transit country, 
resulting in a decrease in the costs borne by the landlocked country. Again, this 
variable is particularly relevant for Central Asian countries. For instance, 
Kazakhstan has only two coastal countries to bargain with. Moreover, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan can only rely on one neighbouring 
country with direct sea access to develop their trade beyond its borders. Finally, 
Uzbekistan is the only example of a doubly landlocked26 country in our sample 
(the only other example is Liechtenstein which is not included here). For 
instance, the other landlocked countries in our sample can choose between 
(minimum) 2 to (maximum) 5 neighboring countries to reach a maritime port. 
With this variable, we want to measure the monopoly power of transit countries, 
ranging from 0 for coastal economies to a positive value for landlocked countries, 
with highest values reflecting the highest costs (due to the perfect monopoly 
position of the transit country). In other words, the more neighboring countries 
with sea access which a landlocked country has, the easier it is to boost 
competition between these countries and subsequently to lower transit costs. An 
                                                 
25 1.146=((1+1/0.6)/ (1+1/0.108))^(-0.101) and  
     1.448=((1+1/0.6)/ (1+1/0.108))^(-0.083-0.194).  
26 I.e. only surrounded by landlocked countries. 
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increase in the number of neighbouring countries with sea access is reflected in 
lower transit costs, where the Bi(j)TRANSIT variable decreases with the number of 
coastal neighbours. We introduce Bi(j)TRANSIT both additively and multiplied to a 
Central Asian dummy. 
 
Hence, the third alternative transport costs function proposed is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
5 62 3 41 1 13
7 8
1 1
ln 1 1
Transit Transit
ij i ij i j ij jB L B B L B BA
ijt ij it jt
Transit Transit
ijt i ij i j ij j
D e K K
M X L B B L B B
α αα α ααθ
β β
+ − + −
= + +

= Ω + − + −
       (5.A3) 
 
With the following expected signs:  
3 40, 0α α> > , β7=(1-σ)α3<0 and  β8=(1-σ)α4<0. 
 
Column 9 of Table 2 confirms that a landlocked country’s trade decreases as the 
monopoly power of transit countries increases (based on the number of options a 
landlocked country has to reach a port). Coefficients associated with Bi TRANSIT and 
Bj TRANSIT have significant and expected negative signs: a decrease of 1 in this 
indicator (reflecting increased competition between transit countries as well as 
greater bargaining power for the landlocked country) implies an increase of 6.2% 
in the imports and of 8.2% in the exports of the given landlocked country.27 This 
result is all the more pertinent for Central Asian countries. Indeed, the median 
indicator for Central Asian countries is 5, corresponding to only one coastal 
neighbour. In other words, these countries have to cope with a situation where 
the transit country has monopoly power. All other things being equal, this implies 
that these countries would import 10.1% more if they were in the same situation 
as a coastal country (i.e. without a transit country) and export 49.2% more. 
Results in column 10 do not reveal any non-linearity in the impact of Bi(j) TRANSIT 
on bilateral trade which is specific to Central Asian countries (the coefficients for 
the variables multiplied with CAi(j) are non-significantly different from zero). 
 
 
                                                 
27 0.062=(e-0.060*-1-1) and 0.082=(e-0.079*-1-1). 
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Table 2: Results of the gravity equation estimates on panel data 
 Mijt      
Variables 5. HT  6. HT  7. HT  8. HT  9. HT  10. HT  
Ln Yit 1.068*** 1.068*** 1.079*** 1.081*** 1.067*** 1.066*** 
 [35.131] [35.151] [42.440] [41.770] [35.123] [35.083] 
Ln Yjt 1.077*** 1.077*** 1.099*** 1.101*** 1.085*** 1.085*** 
 [39.018] [39.013] [47.193] [46.390] [39.511] [39.501] 
Ln Rit 0.584*** 0.620*** 0.598*** 0.563*** 0.585*** 0.619*** 
 [2.675] [2.831] [2.787] [2.600] [2.672] [2.817] 
Ln Rjt 0.920*** 0.959*** 1.027*** 0.996*** 0.941*** 0.980*** 
 [4.230] [4.386] [4.844] [4.643] [4.312] [4.475] 
ln Dij -
1.506*** 
-1.511*** -
1.500*** 
-1.498*** -1.503*** -1.509*** 
 [31.829] [31.900] [31.495] [31.419] [31.688] [31.790] 
Bij 0.986*** 0.984*** 0.924*** 0.797*** 0.959*** 0.954*** 
 [4.374] [4.369] [4.063] [3.468] [4.244] [4.227] 
ln (1+Kit) 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.284*** 0.283*** 0.270*** 0.271*** 
 [6.509] [6.523] [5.359] [6.892] [6.535] [6.566] 
ln (1+Kjt) 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 
 [5.021] [5.026] [6.927] [5.347] [5.072] [5.091] 
CAi  2,999  2.257***  -0,119 
  [0.522]  [2.718]  [0.082] 
CAj  -4,620  2.201***  2,279 
  [0.845]  [2.679]  [1.589] 
Landlocked components:       
1. Distance to the nearest port       
ln (1+Li(1-Bij)DiPORT) -0.033** -
0.042*** 
    
 [2.421] [2.963]     
ln (1+Lj(1-Bij)DjPORT) -
0.062*** 
-
0.073*** 
    
 [4.552] [5.143]     
CAi . ln (1+Li(1-Bij)DiPORT)  -0,032     
  [0.446]     
CAj . ln (1+Lj(1-Bij)DjPORT)  0,064     
  [0.937]     
2. Infrastructure of transit countries       
ln (1+ Li(1-Bij)/KitTRANSIT)   -0,029 -0,034   
   [1.246] [1.416]   
ln (1+ Lj(1-Bij)/KjtTRANSIT)   -
0.083*** 
-
0.082*** 
  
   [3.494] [3.382]   
CAi . ln (1+ Li(1-Bij)/KitTRANSIT)    -0.101***   
    [2.802]   
CAj . ln (1+ Lj(1-Bij)/KjtTRANSIT)    -0.194***   
    [2.614]   
3. No. of borders with coastal 
countries  
      
Li(1-Bij)Bi TRANSIT     -0.060** -
0.093***      [2.219] [3.084] 
Lj(1-Bij)Bj TRANSIT     -
0.079*** 
-
0.105***      [2.969] [3.535] 
CAi . Lj(1-Bij)Bi TRANSIT      0,139 
      [0.470] 
CAj . Lj(1-Bij)Bj TRANSIT      -0,366 
      [1.262] 
Number of obs (NT) 185967 185967 185967 185967 185967 185967 
Number of bilateral (N) 23470 23470 23470 23470 23470 23470 
***, ** and * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (Absolute value of t-student is presented under the 
correspondent coefficient). The time dummy variables and the constant are not reported in order to save space.  
CAi(j) =1 if country i(j) is a Central Asian countries. 
Hausman –Taylor method with endogenous variables = lnYit, lnYjt, ln(1+Kit) and (1+lnKjt ).  
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4. IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES: SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
 
 
Table 3 reports the quartile values for our variables of interest, while Table 4 
summarizes the disadvantages of being landlocked and having a weak 
infrastructure for a representative (i.e. median) Central Asian country.  
 
Table 3: Quartile values (computed on average between 1992 and 2004) 
  Percentile  
  25th Median 75th obs. 
          
K Total sample  0.072 0.403 1.098 167 
 Coastal countries 0.091 1.190 1.996 132 
  CA countries 0.064 0.127 0.168 5 
  Other landlocked countries 0.031 0.264 0.533 30 
KTRANSIT CA countries 0.108 0.108  0.119 5 
 Other landlocked countries 0.064 0.600 0.801 30 
DPORT CA countries 2950 3100 3600 5 
 Other landlocked countries 597.5 870 1206 30 
BTRANSIT CA countries 5 5 5 5 
  Other landlocked countries 2 3 4 30 
Note: CA= Central Asian. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
We compute how the volume of trade of this median Central Asian country will 
change depending on the levels of its own and/or of its transit countries’ 
infrastructure, on the extra transport costs due to overland transport distances 
and on the ability of a landlocked country to negotiate access to the sea. 
 
To summarize, an improvement in the internal infrastructure of each Central 
Asian country from the level of the median Central Asia country to that of the best 
25th percentile of other landlocked countries increases exports and imports by 
6.5% and 8.6% respectively.28 An improvement in K to the level of the median 
coastal country generates an increase in exports and imports of 14.5% and 19.6% 
respectively. The impact of the infrastructure of an individual country is not 
particularly significant29 but it would appear that the infrastructure of transit 
countries is of greater importance for the international trade of landlocked 
countries. This hypothesis is confirmed by the results presented in this Section. 
An improvement in transit country infrastructure to the level of the best 25th 
percentile of other landlocked countries, by cutting transit transport costs, 
increases the representative Central Asian exports flow by 52%. Where all transit 
transport costs are removed, as for a median costal country, representative 
Central Asian export flows would be increased by 90%. 
                                                 
28 Maintening all other variables at the level of the representative Central Asian country (median 
value). 
29 Not specific to landlocked countries, as the associated coefficient is the same for all countries in 
the sample. 
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Table 4: Simulations of trade changes for a median Central Asian 
country 
 
 
Percentile across landlocked 
countries (excl. Central Asia) 
Coastal 
countries 
 25th Median 75th Median  
Exports     
K -1.8% 2.4% 6.5% 14.5% 
KTRANSIT -12.7% 44. 8% 51.8% 89.7% 
DPORT 10.8% 8.2% 6.0% 64.6% 
BTRANSIT 27.1% 17.4% 8.3% 49.2% 
Imports     
K -2.4% 3.1% 8.6% 19.6% 
KTRANSIT -4.9% 14.6% 16.6% 26.5% 
DPORT 5.6% 4.3% 3.2% 30.4% 
BTRANSIT 5.7% 3.1% 1.3% 10.1% 
Note: The construction of the trade changes reported in the above table is as follows. We first 
calculate the predicted trade for a median Central Asian country (on average over 1992-2004), 
denoted MCA. We then compute the predicted trade, denoted Mpred allowing K, KTRANSIT, DjPORT, and 
BTRANSIT to vary successively, while keeping all other variables at the level of the representative 
Central Asian country (median value). The change reported in the table is 100(Mpred/MCA –1). The 
values of K, KTRANSIT, DjPORT, and BTRANSIT chosen for the simulations are the quartile values across 
the landlocked countries (excluding Central Asia) and the median value across coastal countries. All 
the explanatory variable values used in these calculations are reported in Table 3. The gravity 
specifications are found in column 2 of Table 3 and columns 6, 8 and 10 of Tables 1 and 2. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Other dimensions of landlockedness are also great impediments to the trade of 
Central Asian countries. Hence, diminishing the extra overland costs (proxied by 
the distance to the nearest port) or enhancing the ability of a landlocked country 
to negotiate sea access compared to others landlocked countries would 
significantly increase Central Asian trade. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The empirical evidence reviewed in this paper suggests that building roads 
is probably not by itself the best way of alleviating the burden of landlockedness. 
We find that three factors really matter, none of which is directly linked to the 
landlocked CACs’ own infrastructure: overland transportation costs, bargaining 
power with transit countries and the infrastructure of the latter. Moreover, of the 
three components of trade costs arising from landlockedness, only the transit 
countries’ infrastructure is specific to Central Asia. Improvements in transit- 
country infrastructure raise trade three times more for Central Asian countries 
than for other landlocked countries. By contrast, distance to port and the number 
of coastal neighbours a proxy for competition between transit corridors have the 
same impact for Central Asian countries and for other landlocked countries.  
 
 Although these estimates are subject to the usual caveats, their policy message is 
clear. First, transit infrastructure is a regional public good and should be 
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managed as such. Facilitating regional cooperation between landlocked and 
transit countries for the upgrading of transit infrastructure should thus remain a 
clear policy priority for the International financial institutions. Second, 
monopolies in transit corridors are costly. Short of an often doomed quest for 
transit corridor diversification (in a region where many potential routes to 
seashores are marred by instability and conflict) the International financial 
institutions’s recent emphasis on improving the business environment for transit 
services is vindicated, as a policy priority, by our estimates. In particular, the 
progressive shift in Central Asian trade toward China should be accompanied by 
the strategic development of new transit corridors.  
 
From a policy perspective, the large inhibiting effect of landlockedness 
and poor transit infrastructure also matters because it reduces the return to 
trade-policy reform. Once transit bottlenecks are removed, in the logic of 
Friedman and Johnson (1997) policy reform complementarities can set in, reform 
in one area raising the return to reform in others. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
A.1. Countries in the sample. 
 
Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; 
Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; 
Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina 
Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape Verde; Central African 
Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo Rep.; Costa Rica; 
Côte d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominica; 
Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Eritrea; Estonia; 
Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; 
Greece; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; 
Honduras; Hong-Kong; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran Islamic 
Rep.; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; 
Korea Rep.; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao PDR; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; 
Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macao; Macedonia; Madagascar; 
Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Micronesia 
Fed. Sts.; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; 
Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; 
Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; 
Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Sao Tome and Principe; 
Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; 
Slovenia; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Suriname; 
Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania; 
Thailand; Togo; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; 
Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; 
Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Samoa; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen Rep.; Zambia; 
Zimbabwe. 
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A.2. Landlocked and transit countries. 
  
Landlocked Countries Transit Countries 
  
Afghanistan Iran, Pakistan 
Armenia Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Turkey 
Austria Germany, Italy 
Azerbaijan Georgia, Russia 
Bhutan Bangladesh, India 
Bolivia Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru 
Botswana Namibia, South Africa 
Burkina-Faso Côte d’Ivoire, Togo 
Burundi Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 
Central African Rep. Cameroon, Congo Rep., Congo Dem. Rep. 
Chad Cameroon, Nigeria 
Czech Rep. Belgium, Germany, Netherlands 
Ethiopia Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia 
Hungary Austria, Italy 
Kazakhstan 
Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyz Rep., Pakistan, Russia, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Laos Thailand, Vietnam 
Lesotho South Africa 
Luxembourg Belgium, France, Germany 
Malawi Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Mali Burkina-Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal 
Macedonia Albania, Greece 
Mongolia China, Russia 
Nepal Bangladesh, India 
Niger Benin, Burkina-Faso, Nigeria, Togo 
Paraguay Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay 
Rwanda Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 
Slovak Rep. Czech Rep., Germany, Poland 
Swaziland Mozambique, South Africa 
Switzerland Germany, Italy, Netherlands 
Tajikistan Afghanistan, Kyrgyz Rep., Pakistan, Uzbekistan 
Turkmenistan Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia 
Uganda Kenya, Tanzania 
Uzbekistan Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia 
Zambia Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania 
Zimbabwe Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania 
Source: Limao and Venables (2001) and UNCTAD (2004) 
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A.3: Data sources and definitions of the variables 
Mijt: Total bilateral imports, in current US$, by country i from country j at date t, 
UN-COMTRADE. The original database does not contain any zero. 
Yi(j)t: GDP of country i (j) at date t, in constant US$ 2000, CD-ROM WDI, World 
Bank 2005. 
Ni(j)t: Total population of country i (j) at date t, CD-ROM WDI, World Bank 
2005. 
Dij: Distance measured in kilometres between the main city in country i and the 
main city in country j. Most of the time, the main city is the capital city, but 
for some countries the main economic city is considered. Data on distance 
are taken from the CEPII. 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm  
Bij: Dummy equal to one if i and j share a common land border, 0 otherwise. 
Li(j): Dummy equal to one if i (j) is a landlocked country, 0 otherwise. 
Ki(j)t: Infrastructure index based on Limao and Venables (2001) and built using 
four variables proxying the infrastructure from the World Development 
Indicators (WB, 2005): number of kilometres of roads, of paved roads, of 
railways, and number of telephone sets/lines per capita. The first three 
variables are in ratio to the surface area (WB, 2005) in order to obtain the 
density value. Each variable, thus obtained, is normalized to have a mean 
equal to one. An arithmetic average is then calculated over the four variables. 
It has been checked that these data from the World Development Indicators 
are consistent with the data from Antonio Estache and Ana Goicoechea “A 
“Research” Database on Infrastructure Economic Performance World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3643, June 2005. 
RERijt: Bilateral real exchange rate (RER) is computed as follow:  
RERijt = (CPIjt)/(CPIit).(NERit/$t/NERjt/$t),  
Where NERi(j)t/$t is the country i (j)’s currency value for one US$ at date t and 
CPIi(j)t the consumption price index for country i (j) at date t. Data are taken 
from the IFS database. If the CPI is not available, the GDP deflator is used 
instead. For each pair of countries, we specify the RER, for example its mean 
over the period is zero. 
Ri(j)t : Remoteness index defined as the weighted distance to all trading partners 
of country i: 
Rit = ∑
j
ijjt Dw  for i ≠ j and with ∑
=
j
jt
jt
jt Y
Y
w for all i.  
Bi(j) TRANSIT : For each landlocked country i (j), we set a variable that takes the 
value 1 if the country j(i) is a neighbouring country (Bij=1) and if j(i) is a 
coastal country Lj(i)=1, otherwise 0. Then for each landlocked country i(j), we 
sum the countries j(i) that have the value 1, i.e. the number of neighbour 
countries with sea access. For all the landlocked countries in the world, this 
number is between 0 and 5. Then, since we want Bi(j)t TRANSIT to capture a cost, 
we associate the highest value (6) when the number of coastal neighbours is 
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0, and then respectively 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 for 1, 2, 3 and 4 coastal neighbours. 
Last, since a coastal country has no cost, we set Bi(j)t TRANSIT to 0 if the country 
i is not landlocked. This variable is adjusted by Li(j)(1- Bi(j)), i.e. it is set to 0 
for costal countries and for trade between neighbouring countries. 
 
Di(j)PORT : Distance measured in kilometres between the main city in country i 
(mostly the capital city) and access to the nearest port. The data come from 
Faye et al. (2005) and the authors’ calculations. This variable is adjusted by 
Li(j)(1- Bi(j)), i.e. it is set to 0 for costal countries and for trade between 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Ki(j)tTRANSIT: Average value of infrastructure for transit countries if a country is 
landlocked, 0 otherwise. Appendix A.2 lists the landlocked countries with the 
respective transit countries they use.  Since we want to capture the cost 
associated with landlockedness, we use the inverse of the variable. Again, 
1/KitTRANSIT is adjusted by Li(j)(1- Bi(j)), i.e. it is set to 0 for costal countries 
and for trade between neighbouring countries. 
CAi(j): Dummy equal to one if i (j) is a Central Asian country, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
